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Martin, Mary-Jo, MA, October 16, 1985 Clinical Psychology
Effects of Judges' Instructions in Court Proceedings on Juror 
Memory for Facts (89 pp.)
Director: Herman A. Walters
Subjects recruited from college undergraduate classes (n = 120) 
in three groups (n = 40 for each group) served as "experimental" 
jurors and viewed a videotaped reenactment of an excerpt from a 
civil trial. The trial involved negligence in the death of a 
young man on a construction project. Group One viewed a tape that 
included four pieces of inadmissible evidence, a judge's ruling on 
inadmissibility and a judge's admonishment to the jurors (subjects) 
to disregard the inadmissible testimony. Group Two viewed an 
edited version of the same tape which included the inadmissible 
testimony and the judge's rulings but did not include the 
admonishment. Group Three (control) viewed the tape on which both 
the judge's rulings and admonishments had been deleted.
Results indicated that jurors in both Group One and Group Two 
recalled correct information on one of four memory items (embedded 
in the dependent measures) significantly more often than jurors in 
Group Three. On this same item, all three groups expressed a high 
mean confidence rating in the correctness of their answer, with 
Group One expressing the greatest confidence, followed by Group 
Two and then Group Three. On a second memory item (of the four). 
Group Throe recalled correct information significantly more often 
than Group Two. Taken as a composite measure, there were no 
significant differences among the three groups on the four memory 
items, therefore disconfirming the research hypothesis that jurors 
who were exposed to more information (e.g., judge's rulings and 
instructions) regarding inadmissible evidence would recall that 
information more often than jurors who had not heard the judicial 
rulings and admonishments.
Additional findings indicated that there were no differences for 
sox, ago, or experimental condition on the case-outcome decision. 
The mean confidence rating for this decision revealed that all 
subjects felt very confident in their verdicts. Of note is the 
fact that subjects' decisions regarding negligence paralleled the 
decisions made by jurors in the actual trial.
The possible explanations for the mixed findings are discussed 
as well as general research findings on the memory process that 
support the possible explanations. Directions for future 
investigations on memory and its significance in the juridic 
process were proposed.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In 1966, a lawyer and political scientist, James Marshall, 
assessed the American trail-by-jury system and found it to be ignorant 
of the most elementary of psychological principles. His primary 
criticism was of the assumptions made by the rulemakers on points of 
evidentiary admissibility and instruction— instructions concerning lay 
inference and perception on the part of jurors. Marshall's book was 
aptly titled Law and Psychology in Conflict. The counter-accusation 
was aimed at social scientists who conducted research without an 
adequate understanding of the legal framework to which their studies 
purportedly pertain. Indeed, the history of psycholegal research has 
been described as a succession of interchanges between optimistic 
psychologists attempting to "redeem" the law and a reactive legal 
community rejecting the generalization of laboratory research to real 
life (Loh, 1981). Until recent time, an uneasy partnership has 
prevailed, with occasional outright hostility, each side carrying on 
"as though the other did not exist" (Fahr, 1961).
More recently, a collaborative effort has been evidenced with an 
increasing consciousness that psychological research requires more 
sensitivity to the lawyer's point of view (Loh, 1981). In addition, 
the conflict has been reduced by the formation of a group of 
specialists in psycholegal studies. In the past, most of the people 
writing on psychology and law did not have the subject as their
- 1-
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principal professional interest (Saks, 1979). Some knowledge of how 
the law defines, analyzes and manages problems is needed in undertaking 
applied research on law.
Rather than the two disciplines working in opposition, it is now 
more frequently the case that scholars are engaging in research 
specifically tailored to address certain court issues, as exemplified 
in jury studies. The jury trial in the United States, although 
comprising only about 10 percent of actual cases, has been the focus of 
particular concern to researchers interested in the formal legal 
process (Bray & Kerr, 1982; Ellison & Buckout, 1981; Hastie, Penrod & 
Pennington, in press; Konecni & Ebbesen, 1982; Nemeth, 1981; Saks & 
Kidd, 1981; Sales, 1981). As Simon (1975) points out, the jury system 
is older than the United States, having been inherited from the British 
commonlaw system. Cases decided by a jury reflect important matters, 
such as concerns to the community, disputes over information, or 
political and social issues. Because of its crucial and highly 
publicized actions, juries are susceptible to much scrutiny and attack 
(Wrightsman, 1978). For example. Judge Jerome Frank expressed this 
view;
It is inconceivable that a body of twelve ordinary men, 
casually gathered together for a few days, could, merely, 
from listening to the instructions of the judge, gain the 
knowledge necessary to grasp the true import of the judge's 
words (1949, p. 116).
Trial attorney, F. Lee Bailey, expresses similar pessimism on the 
topic. He writes:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A trial by jury, conceived long before there was a United 
States as a great equalizer purporting to deliver all 
citizens equal justice under law, is in fact a terrifying 
experience, riddled with uncertainty and often happenstance 
(1978, p. 7).
Criticism of the jury system has stimulated research in many areas 
of concern (see Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, chap. 1; Winters, 1971; 
Wrightsman, 1978). Critics argue that the time it takes to process a 
jury trial is a major cause of the stupefying backlog of cases 
(Rosenblatt, 1972), that jurors often ignore the law and base their 
decisions on whim, sympathy, or prejudice (Elwork et al,, 1977), and 
that rules designed to instruct jurors on law and procedure are 
cumbersome, too technically worded and less-than-understandable to 
the average juror, causing arbitrary juridic decisions (Elwork ot al,, 
1977, p. 2).
It has been advocated that research in this area should attempt 
to test the implicit psychological foundations of the rules of 
evidence and procedure (Penrod & Borgida, 1982; Loh, 1981). Much 
of the research thus far has been directed at demonstrating that 
certain evidence, procedures or instructions will have certain effects 
on lay decision-making. Little research has focused on what cognitive 
factors might mediate these effects. Derek Bok, President of Harvard 
University, recently stated
Scholars have shown little interest in the theories of 
cognition that might help decide whether rules of evidence 
permit judges to make more accurate decisions or merely
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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accumulate useless data that add to legal expenses and
delays (Bok, 1983, p. 45).
Monahan and Loftus (1982) provide a current review of psychological 
research on law and describe three interrelated domains of interest:
(a) operation of the legal system (the way in which cases are 
disposed); (b) process factors affecting outcomes in jury trials (juror 
and defendant characteristics, evidential factors, eyewitness 
testimony or procedural rules); and (c) substantive law. This latter 
domain addresses the validity of assumptions about behavior which are 
the basis for law. Monahan and Loftus (1982) note further that these 
assumptions can be "descriptive", such as distinctions between the 
legal competencies of children and adults, or "consequential", such as 
assumptions about the behavioral effect of criminal sanction. (For 
comprehensive reviews of jury research, see Saks & Hastie, 1978; Nemeth, 
1981; Wrightsman, 1978; and Kalven & Zeisel, 1966.)
The present investigation will be concerned with an area of 
substantive law, namely, judicial instructions regarding methods of 
inference and decision-making jurors are to use when deciding a case. 
Jury trials are governed by three types of rules: (a) the rules of
evidence, (b) the rules of procedure, and (c) the rules of judicial 
instruction (Penrod & Borgida, 1982). The rules of procedure structure 
the progress of courtroom behavior. The rules of evidence are designed 
to regulate the presentation of information to jurors. Jury 
instructions inform jurors about the meaning of the law and aid them in 
applying it to the facts of the case. All of these rules have been 
designed to increase the probability that jurors will reach a correct
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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verdict. It is not presumed that jurors are in any way familiar with 
the rules; rather, the responsibility of applying them fairly and 
accurately rests with the trial judge. However, it is assumed that 
jurors will heed instructions and apply the law as stated.
It is the intent of this work to further the understanding of the 
circumstances under which judicial instruction may be ineffective and 
may even be damaging to a juror’s ability to apply the law fairly. 
Specifically, it will be hypothesized that a judge's instructions to 
the jury to disregard certain facts that have been presented in a case 
are not only ineffective, but may serve to enhance the jurors' memory 
for those facts, thus prejudicing the verdict reached. The research 
to be reviewed here supports the first hypothesis— that is, the 
assumption that jurors can ignore evidence when deciding a case is a 
weak assumption and ignores psychological theory to a great extent.
The memory variable is one that has not been adequately tested in this 
research. It has been suggested that the instructions may serve to 
make inadmissible evidence more salient for jurors and hence available 
in memory (Tanford & Penrod, in press; Carretta & Moreland, 1983).
Some variables that have been studied concerning jurors’ responses 
to judicial instruction include the language and timing of instructions 
(Elwork et al., 1977), the level of severity of the judge’s 
admonishment (Wolf & Montgomery, 1977), juror personality variables 
(Berg & Vidmar, 1975), different levels of ambiguity in the admissible 
evidence (i.e., weak vs. strong) (Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973), 
jurors’ felt competence as it relates to attitude change (Wicklund & 
Brehm, 1968), the impact of pretrial publicity on decisions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(Padawar-Singer & Barton, 1975; Simon, 1967; Sue, Smith, & Gilbert, 
1974) and, finally, jurors' integration of evidential and nonevidential 
information when determining guilt (Kaplan & Kemraerick, 1974).
Implicit in all of these studies is that many factors affect how 
jurors perceive and interpret judicial instruction, as well as how 
they use instructions in decision-making. What has been lacking is 
much insight into the cognitive processes that mediate the effects.
While memory is only one cognitive factor involved in the process, 
it is one of the most important. It is usually the case that jurors 
are not allowed to take notes. It is assumed that they can keep all 
the facts of the case in their minds, as well as instructions about 
which facts to disregard. It would seem that memory is the juror's 
most important and critical tool in deciding cases; thus, it is a 
logical place to begin exploring psychological processes that 
contribute to the actions and decisions of jurors.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II 
MEMORY AND RECALL
Tanford and Penrod (in press), investigating the effects of 
joined trials (more than one offense tried simultaneously) on juror 
decisions, found that a defendant was more likely to be convicted on 
a particular charge in a joined trial than on the same charge tried 
alone. They also found judges' instructions to consider evidence 
separately for each charge to be ineffective in reducing this 
conviction rate. The researchers suggest that a cognitive explanation 
for this is that jurors experienced interference effects when trying 
to remember material, being unable to separate the evidence for one 
charge from the evidence of another when deliberating.
Support for interference effects in long-term memory comes from 
research that demonstrates that when subjects learn multiple lists of 
word pairs, they make intrusions (confuse words) between lists when 
asked to recall them (Postman & Underwood, 1973). In a more social 
context, research on impression formation indicates that specific 
information is recalled in relation to an overall impression 
(Hamilton, 1981; Hastie, 1981; Hastie & Kumar, 1979). Berman, Read 
and Kenny (1983) found that information consistent with earlier 
impressions was more likely to be remembered, and Snyder and 
Uranowitz (1978) found that subjects reconstructed events over time 
to make them more consistent with earlier impressions.
-7-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
These results all suggest that, in trial proceedings, where jurors 
rely on memory, they are likely to experience confusion when reviewing 
the facts of the case. More specifically, a judge's instructions to 
disregard certain facts may be ineffective due to a juror's inability 
to specifically remember which facts are to be disregarded. Further, 
jurors may organize certain facts to fit existing overall impressions, 
ignoring instructions that are dissonant with this organization.
Impression formation research also suggests that negative 
information is weighted more heavily than positive (Fiske, 1980;
Hamilton & Huffman, 1971; Hodges, 1974). Negative trial evidence may 
accumulate faster and be more readily recalled than positive facts 
during deliberation.
A judge's instructions to disregard particular evidence certainly 
carry an implicit negative connotation. Jurors may weigh whatever they 
heard, regardless of its incompleteness, as more negative and more 
salient than other positive information.
Supporting this, experiments on belief perseverance Have shown 
that people do not disregard information even after it has been completely 
discredited (Lord et al., 1979; Ross et al., 1975). Instructions could 
possibly increase this demonstrated prejudice in the court situation, 
enhancing jurors' memory for the inadmissible testimony and their 
adherence to initial impressions. Tanford and Penrod (1972), in their 
research on the effects of joined trials (more than one offense tried 
simultaneously) on jurors' decisions, found that the traditional legal 
remedy for possible prejudice in this type of trial (judicial
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
instruction) did not reduce conviction tendencies in spite of a strong 
and complete set of instructions.
Reactance Theory— The Boomerang Effect
Some researchers have investigated the mechanisms underlying 
belief perseverance in jurors. Notably, Wicklund and Brehm (1968) 
applied psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) to the mock juror 
paradigm in order to provide empirical support for the theory.
Reactance theory holds that whenever a person's freedom to engage 
in various behaviors is eliminated or threatened, that person will be 
motivated to restore the freedom that is threatened. This motivational 
state is called "psychological reactance".
According to this theory, when pressured to adopt a strong stand 
on one side of a two-sided issue, such as when a judge instructs 
jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence, the individual should be 
motivated to resist moving toward that stand and to move away from it. 
For example, in regard to opinions, a juror should experience 
reactance whenever he feels free to adopt or avoid any of several 
positions on an issue and is then pressured to adopt a particular one. 
The "boomerang" nature of the reactance is seen in not only the 
juror's avoidance of adopting the position being forced upon him 
(i.e., not to use inadmissible evidence in deliberating), but also 
in adhering more strongly to his "threatened" freedom— his original 
opinion which may have incorporated the inadmissible evidence. Wicklund 
and Brehm (1968) found this to be the case with subjects who were led 
to believe that they were competent to deal with the issue at hand.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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It has been shown that, as a person's felt competence pertaining to an 
issue increases, the more reactance he should experience when his 
attitudinal freedom is threatened.
It follows that if a juror is reacting to instructions to disregard 
certain testimony and moving in an attitudinal direction away from those 
instructions, he or she may actually attend to that piece of information 
and recall it more easily, more often, and more accurately than evidence 
that has been presented without any ruling as to its admissibility.
This might be due to the added time for processing the information that 
has been highlighted by the judge's ruling, and the added "reactance" 
processing time.
Coupled with findings on impression formation, reactance theory 
provides a framework within which to examine memory processes involved 
in decision-making. An impression is both the product and the source 
of inferences made about a defendant. Jurors may initially form an 
impression that the defendant has a criminal disposition based on the 
fact that he is charged with a crime. The negative impression then 
affects inferences of the likelihood of guilt. The judgment of guilt 
that results from this process is quite résistent to change in response 
to judges' instructions, due to psychological reactance. These theories 
suggest that jurors' memory may be selective for those facts that 
convey negative information and may also be highly resistant to change, 
hence prejudicing decisions.
Findings on memory as a variable in judgments have been 
contradictory thus far, with researchers finding in some cases that 
memory is related to verdicts (Bordens & Horowitz, 1983), while in some
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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it does not seem to have an effect (Tanford & Penrod, 1982; Greene & 
Loftus, 1981). However, only a meager effort has been made in the 
investigation of processes involved in subjects' judgments, with all 
of the limitations characteristic of much existing research on juror 
behavior.
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CHAPTER III 
LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
A number of flaws have been noted in the existing body of research 
on juror behavior. For instance, there is still considerable doubt 
about which factors mediate the effects that have been found in 
experiments with jurors. The effects have often been demonstrated 
with only speculation as to the psychological mediators involved.
Also, although the existing research provides some information about 
judgments made by undergraduates responding to questionnaires, it does 
not provide substantial insight into the processes in operation for 
jurors within the context of an actual jury trial.
The level of complexity inherent in any courtroom trial is 
difficult to simulate in the laboratory with undergraduate volunteers. 
This accounts for the selection of only certain features of the jury 
trial for study rather than staging a complete trial for research 
purposes. For example, the number of days or weeks involved in some 
jury trials would preclude exact reenactment in most laboratory 
settings.
Monahan and Loftus (1982) have cogently addressed the methodological 
issue of laboratory versus field study research. These authors emphasize 
that the primary purpose of the research is what is germane to the 
issue. If the main concern is the prediction of juror behavior in 
actual trials, then the external validity assumes a more pressing role
- 12-
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such that field studies would be the method of choice. However, when 
concerned with theory or the exploration of new variables, internal 
validity takes on the major significance and controlled laboratory 
studies are best at maximizing control to answer specific questions.
The use of undergraduates as opposed to "real" jurors also affects 
the generalizability of results. This is perhaps the most consistent 
and important criticism leveled against jury research. However, when 
college students' judgments were compared with those of actual former 
jurors in a recent study by Hinkle et al. (1983), it was found that, 
while students were more lenient than the former jurors (i.e., gave 
more insane verdicts than guilty verdicts), the pattern of responses 
over several measures was very similar. This suggests that courtroom 
experience possibly makes former jurors more conservative. It also 
suggests that the students respond in the same direction as former 
jurors and are, hence, not that different in their juridic behavior.
The economic and time considerations in any analogue research 
must also be taken seriously in the design of such a study. Therefore, 
while generalizability is compromised to some extent, the important 
findings in research with undergraduates may be easily subjected to 
another test with actual jurors at a later time, after the initial 
question has been answered in a timely, efficient manner.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IV 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
There are situations in which jurors will be instructed by the 
trial judge that they may (or are) obliged to interpret evidence in a 
particular way. In general, instructions to juries are concerned 
with the manner in which presumptions are to be made (Penrod & Borgida, 
1982); that is, the relationship between a set of basic facts that is 
proved in court and a second set of facts, the presumed facts.
If the jury is told it may make a particular inference and told 
this by the trial judge, who carries great authority in the courtroom, 
it is conceivable that they will make the inference in most, if not 
all, situations in which the opportunity arises. Similarly, when a 
judge instructs on inadmissibility, the jurors' attention may be 
greater in response to this authoritative message, and this response, 
in turn, may plant this information more firmly in their minds.
Questions about presumptions raise important issues about jury 
instructions. In all trials, jurors are instructed about standards of 
proof; that is, in criminal cases, jurors are told that the prosecution 
must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. On the 
civil side, the plaintiff must prove its case by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Researchers have attempted to discover whether jurors 
can understand and make appropriate use of these instructions. One 
very important question that has been asked is "can jurors obey
— 14—
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instructions informing them that they are to make limited use of 
evidence presented?"
Limiting Instructions
A trial judge can offer a compensatory, limiting instruction that 
instructs the jury on the appropriate use of certain evidentiary 
information (Livermore, 1978). Limiting instructions are commonly 
used in cases where inadmissible evidence has been heard by the jurors, 
but the judge does not want them to use this evidence when deciding the 
case. Although it is presumed that jurors can follow these 
instructions, there is a great deal of skepticism among researchers 
about the effectiveness of limiting instructions.
The Juror's Moral Dilemma
When inadmissible evidence provides necessary and sufficient 
information to convince a jury of a defendant's guilt, and such 
evidence cannot (or should not) be considered in the rendering of 
their verdict, jurors are faced with two uncomfortable choices:
(a) to find the defendant not guilty based on legal rules and release 
a criminal, or (b) to decide on a guilty verdict based on evidence 
which they have been admonished by the judge to disregard.
This role conflict has been discussed by Radish and Radish 
( 1 9 7 1 ) :
If the juror is obliged to do as he is told in the court 
instructions and if he may, nevertheless, do as he thinks 
best and he in fact is afforded every protection to do as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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he thinks best and his function as a juror is extolled 
because jurors sometimes do— how is the conscientious juror 
to understand his role? What is he to do in his jural 
role if following the court instructions would lead to a 
verdict he is convinced ought to be otherwise? (p. 205)
Judge's Dilemma
When unreliable or illegally-gathered information is presented at 
a trial, judges have only two alternatives. They may declare a mistrial, 
an expensive and time-consuming procedure that delays the justice 
process, or they may attempt to counteract the biasing impact of 
inadmissible evidence by admonishing the jury to ignore it. Obviously, 
evidence cannot be struck as easily from the minds of jurors as it can 
from the court record (Kadish & Kadish, 1971).
The research findings on the effectiveness of judges' admonishments 
have been equivocal (Saks & Hastie, 1978; Lind, 1982). For instance, 
in the area of the effects of pretrial publicity on juror decision­
making, Kline and Jess (1966) and Simon (1967) found that jurors were 
apparently able to ignore pretrial publicity when instructed by the 
judge. However, Padawar-Singer and Barton (1975) and Sue, Smith and 
Padroza (1975) found that pretrial publicity did affect judgments in 
the direction of more guilty verdicts.
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CHAPTER V
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions designed to offset the effects of inadmissible 
evidence in a trial have been investigated from several different 
standpoints, the results presenting a mixed picture.
Sue, Smith, and Caldwell (1973) presented experimental jurors 
with either weak or strong evidence against a defendant in a murder 
case. In each condition, subjects were given either additional 
evidence ruled admissible, additional evidence ruled inadmissible, or 
no additional evidence. They found that subjects were biased by 
inadmissible evidence in the weak condition but not in the strong 
condition, indicating that the controversial evidence became quite 
salient in jurors' minds when there was insufficient evidence on which 
to make a decision. This occurred in spite of the judge's 
admonishments to disregard the inadmissible testimony.
Wolf and Montgomery (1977) carried out a similar study in which 
subjects heard critical testimony that was subsequently ruled 
admissible, or inadmissible with an admonishment by the judge to 
disregard the testimony. Interestingly, the results indicated that, 
when the critical testimony was simply ruled inadmissible, it had 
little effect on guilt judgments (subjects did not find the defendant 
guilty any more often than subjects in a control group who did not get 
the inadmissible ruling). However, with specific instructions to
-17-
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disregard that testimony, experimental jurors' verdicts were influenced 
in the direction of that testimony (they found the defendant guilty 
significantly more often than subjects who only heard the inadmissible 
ruling). Subjects in this condition also expressed a greater desire 
to be allowed to consider the inadmissible testimony than subjects in 
the "inadmissible-without-instructions" condition. This led the 
researchers to interpret the results in terms of psychological 
reactance theory (Brehm, 1966).
Wolf and Montgomery (1977) ruled out the effects of salience of 
the critical testimony raised by the judge's admonishment as an 
alternative explanation of the results. By including in all experimental 
conditions a final charge to the jury mentioning the critical testimony, 
they attempted to make the testimony equally available in memory for 
all jurors. This feature of their design does make reactance theory a 
more plausible explanation for their results. However, the design 
does not lend itself to an adequate investigation of the role that 
memory may have in actual trial proceedings. When a judge rules on 
critical testimony or instructs the jury to disregard certain evidence, 
it most commonly occurs during the trial proceedings, embedded in the 
context of the evidence that admissible. It is unlikely that a 
judge would remind the jury of just certain items of evidence or 
facts of the case at the end of the trial.
Hence, it is understandable that these researchers were able to 
demonstrate a specific phenomenon, psychological reactance, under very 
specific circumstances designed to rule out other factors involved in 
jury decision-making. However, under more realistic circumstances,
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it is just as plausible that memory for facts is an important mediator 
in how a juror behaves in deciding a case. A judge’s instructions to 
disregard certain facts heard along with a great deal of evidence may 
serve to make those facts more salient for jurors when they begin to 
review the case as a whole. While reactance theory may be one 
explanation of jurors' apparent failure to follow the judge's 
instructions, more work is needed to discern what other factors 
contribute to this phenomenon.
In 1981, Thompson, Fong and Rosenhan found that the verdicts of 
mock jurors exposed to stricken proacquittal evidence were affected by 
the evidence despite limiting instructions, while the verdicts of 
jurors who received inadmissible proconviction evidence did not differ 
from those of jurors in a control condition. These researchers used 
two forms of judge's instructions: (a) the judge either emphasized
the importance of strict adherence to procedural quidelines (due 
process instructions), or (b) minimized the importance of such 
guidelines and instead emphasized the importance of an accurate verdict 
(crime control instructions). This variation was included to address 
the different concepts of justice held by the courts and lay people; 
due process versus "right" outcomes, respectively. It was predicted 
that inadmissible evidence would have greater influence on jurors who 
received the crime control instructions.
No significant effect was found for the variation in the judge's 
instructions nor did this factor interact with any of the other 
variables. This finding is particularly interesting because it is a 
more drastic variation than would ever occur in a real court. By legal
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standards, the crime control instructions would be considered extremely 
prejudicial. Although the reasons for this finding were not explored, 
it suggests strongly that jurors tend to decide cases according to 
their own standards of justice and may not be influenced by what a judge 
says. Again, the mechanisms of the jurors* behavior were not 
investigated here, but the findings are consistent with research that 
begs for a closer look at these mechanisms.
Doob and Kirschenbaum (1972) and Hans and Doob (1976) found that 
instructions designed to limit juror use of prior conviction evidence 
was ineffectual; jurors who heard the prior record evidence were more 
likely to convict.
One factor that may constrain the effectiveness of compensatory 
limiting instructions is that standard jury instructions are 
characteristically overburdened with jargon and difficult to 
comprehend, let alone use appropriately (Danet, 1980). Charrow and 
Charrow (1979), for example, randomly selected qualified jurors and 
asked them to listen to audiotaped judicial instructions in a civil 
trial. Using a recall technique, the researchers found that the juror 
paraphrasing of instructions included only about one-third of the 
linguistic units in the original instructions.
Elwork, Sales and Alfini (1977) also have shown that comprehensibility 
of judicial instructions may be a factor in their appropriate use. More 
recently (1982), they found that prior to jury deliberations in a 
criminal trial, the average juror may comprehend only half of the judge's 
instructions. However, it has been shown that the application of
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linguistic principles to jury instructions to clarify meaning can 
improve juror understanding (Severance S Loftus, 1982).
Timing of Instructions
Another factor that may limit the effectiveness of instructions is 
the way they are presented during the proceedings. The traditional 
practice has been to present them at the end of the trial. Although 
preliminary instructions have been used occasionally, there is a 
concern that this may affect juror decision-making by over-emphasizing 
the issues raised in such instructions (Penrod & Borgida, 1982).
Concerns over timing are not unprecedented. Over 20 years ago, 
for example, in arguing for the use of preliminary trial instructions. 
Judge Prettyman (1960) questioned a juror's ability to
. . .  go back over a stream of conflicting statements of 
alleged facts, recall the intonation, the demeanor, or even 
the existence of the witnesses, and retrospectively sift all 
these recollections into a pattern of evaluation and judgment 
given him for the first time after the event. . . . The 
fact of the matter is that this order of procedure makes 
much of a trial or a lawsuit mere mumbo-jumbo (p. 1066).
Similarly, Sales et al. (1977) argued that it is unreasonable to 
expect jurors to recall and evaluate all of the appropriate evidence 
after the judicial instructions are explained at the end of the trial.
A study by Kassin and Wrightsraan (1979) provides further support 
for the importance of the timing of instructions. College student 
jurors watched the videotaped reenactment of a case in which the
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defendant was charged with stealing a car and transporting it across 
state lines. Judicial instruction on the requirements of proof were 
included either at the end of the trial or before the evidence was 
presented. A third control group did not receive the traditional 
instructions. Kassin and Wrightsman (1979) found that jurors who 
received instructions before the evidence were less likely to convict 
the defendant than jurors who received no instructions, whereas jurors 
who received the instructions after the trial did not differ in their 
verdicts from the jurors who received no instructions. Although 
recall of case related facts was high for all jurors, jurors who 
received instructions after the trial demonstrated poorer recall than 
jurors who were preinstructed.
Direct vs. Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evidence
The available research clearly suggests that evidence that has 
been ruled inadmissible by a judge can have an important influence on 
jurors' reactions toward a defendant.
In a recent study (1983), Carretta and Moreland explored the 
"indirect" effects of inadmissible evidence. They defined "indirect 
effects" as being either "intrapersonal"— changes in individual information 
processing— or "interpersonal"— changes in how jury members talk about 
a case to one another during deliberations. Direct effects relate to 
the outcome of juridic decisions, that is, either guilt or innocense.
In their study, Carretta and Moreland (1983) presented a summary 
of a murder trial to college students acting as jurors. The strength 
of the case against the defendant was manipulated, as was the inclusion
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of wiretapping evidence that favored either the prosecution or the 
defense and was ruled either admissible or inadmissible by the judge. 
Direct effects of inadmissible evidence on subjects' reactions toward 
the defendant were investigated before and after their group discussions. 
The subjects' behavior during these discussions was observed in order
to investigate the indirect effects of inadmissible evidence.
Whether it favored the prosecution or the defense, inadmissible 
evidence directly biased subjects' reactions toward the defendant and 
indirectly biased their behavior during group discussions. The results 
also showed that the direct effects of inadmissible evidence were at 
least partially mediated by its indirect effects. More specifically, 
Carretta and Moreland (1983) found that the discussion served to either 
strengthen or weaken the direct effects of inadmissible evidence on a 
group's decision. During the discussions, the inadmissible evidence 
was always a relatively salient topic. Whenever one group member 
mentioned inadmissible evidence during a discussion however, another
member often responded by reminding the group about the judge's ruling.
This phenomenon occurred about 56 percent of the time among groups that 
received any condition in which the wiretapping evidence was 
inadmissible. The researchers concluded that the subjects 
"monitored" one another during the group discussions so as to minimize 
any possible effects of inadmissible evidence on their decisions.
This study indicates that inadmissible evidence is a salient part 
of the information that jurors use when deciding a case. The direct 
effects of this salience may vary with both intrapersonal and 
interpersonal characteristics of jurors, as well as whether the
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inadmissible evidence favors the prosecution or the defense, and a 
host of other considerations mentioned in this literature review.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND HYPOTHESIS
James Marshall (1966) concluded his book by stating:
In a civilization so largely founded on scientific method, 
and in which daily living is so dependent upon the 
application of scientific findings, the theory and 
practice of law remain largely immune to this prevailing 
pattern (p. 103).
On the basis of research findings in this area, it is reasonable 
to question the ability of jurors to heed judicial instructions which 
admonish them to disregard inadmissible evidence when they make their 
juridic decisions. The issue is infused with significant implications 
for our present system of justice, not the least of which is the fact 
that often irreversible decisions are made about the lives of 
individuals within this system.
It was the intent of this project to explore memory factors in 
jury decision-making and how memory may be affected by judicial 
instruction.
Based on previous research pertaining to the behavior of jurors 
as well as our understanding of certain cognitive factors involved in 
memory and recall, the research hypothesis tested is as follows:
It is predicted that experimental jurors instructed to 
ignore inadmissible evidence will recall that piece of
-25-
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evidence, regardless of its incompleteness, more 
frequently and more accurately than subjects not receiving 
the judicial admonishment but exposed to the same set of 
basic facts.
In addition, it is predicted that important 
relationships might be found between memory for facts and 
trial outcome.
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CHAPTER VII
SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROJECT
The results of this project are intended to add information to a 
growing body of research which calls for the revision of our jury 
system as it now operates.
The criticisms of this area of social science research are 
widespread. In addressing this criticism (see Chapter I), an attempt 
is being made to go beyond superficial cause-effect research to 
investigate underlying cognitive processes that may contribute to 
jurors' decisions. The major criticism pertains to the questionable 
generalizability of psychological research to the "real-world" judicial 
process. This criticism is attended to here by a review of past 
related research. This project is designed to be as similar as possible 
to the actual jury trial. The use of a civil case that was previously 
tried in local courts and a videotaped presentation to the experimental 
jurors place this research in a small category of projects of this type 
in terms of external validity and "true-to-life" conditions.
Since jurors are not allowed to take notes during proceedings (in 
most cases), it is felt that their reliance on memory is great. It is, 
in fact, a most important factor in deciding which facts of the case 
determine the outcome of a trial. It follows that an empirical 
investigation of the conditions under which jurors remember (or forget) 
certain facts is both needed and important to the legal community and
-27-
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researchers in this area. Considerations of modifications in our 
existing system may need to rest on the kind of information in this 
study, gathered in an empirical, scientific way.
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CHAPTER VIII 
METHOD
Sub1ects
One hundred and twenty male and female subjects (40 per group) 
were recruited from undergraduate classes during the 8-week summer 
session at the University of Montana. Subjects were allowed to sign 
up for one hour afternoon or evening experimental sessions held at the 
Clinical Psychology Center. Characteristics of the subject sample 
appear in Table 1.
Experimental Design
The proposed project employed a Between Groups Randomized design 
(Kazdin, 1978), with post-test measurements only. The subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of three groups, with males and females being 
approximately equally balanced. Experimental Group One heard and saw 
testimony that included the introduction of inadmissible evidence, a 
ruling by the judge on inadmissibility and the judge's admonishment to 
the jury to disregard that evidence. Experimental Group Two heard and 
saw the same testimony with the judge's ruling on inadmissibility, but 
with rm instructions to jurors to disregard it. Group Three (control) 
heard the same case, with no rulings on inadmissibility and no 
instructions by the judge. The design is depicted in Table 2. The 
independent variables were: (a) the judge's ruling of inadmissibility-
-29-
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Table 1
Subject Characteristics (N = 120, M = 49, F = 71) (40 per group)
Age
Year in 
College
Prior
Jury
Member
Range 18-54 1-5* 1 = Yes
2 = No
X 28.13 3.2 .15
SD 3.03 1.4 .36
*5 = graduate student or "other"
Table 2
Experimental Design
Stimulus Materials Group One Group Two Group Three
Written Case Summary *
Videotaped Presentation ■j;- ■ÎC-
Inadmissibility Ruling
Judge's Instructions to Disregard *
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present or absent, and, (b) the judge's instructions to disregard the 
inadmissible evidence— present or absent.
Materials
Each subject received a booklet containing a summary of the case 
and instructions on their role as experimental jurors (Appendix A).
The case used was adapted from a civil case heard in  Missoula County 
in 1979— Plovhar (Plaintiffs) vs. Board of Trustees of Missoula County 
High School (Defendant). Videotaped presentations were prepared with 
the help of student-actors and were based on the testimony of Arlyn 
Simms, a supervisor at the Vocational-Technical Center at the time of 
the accident. A summary of the transcript of his testimony is 
contained in Appendix B. Verbatim transcripts, being too lengthy to 
include in the appendix, are available from the researcher on request. 
All last names of the people involved in this case have been changed in 
order to protect their privacy.
Procedure
Subjects signed up during summer quarter, 1985, for specified one 
to one-and-a-half hour experimental sessions. The particular 
videotaped version shown at any session was randomly selected, 
independent of the selection of subjects.
Subjects arriving at the experimental site were greeted by the 
experimenter. Subjects were assigned to seats in a small classroom 
and told that they were to be serving as experimental jurors in a 
reconstruction of an actual civil trial. It was stressed that they
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must approach the task as if they were the actual Jurors, hearing the 
case for the first time, with important consequences attached to their 
decisions.
Subjects were then given a booklet containing a summary of the 
case being presented, an introduction to the videotaped segment of the 
trial and further instructions pertaining to their role as experimental 
jurors (see Appendix A). Ten minutes was allowed for subjects to read 
the summary and the experimenter then asked if everyone understood the 
instructions. If there were no questions, one of the three videotaped 
versions of the trial was shown (see Appendix B for a synposis of the 
contents of the videotapes).
After viewing the videotape, subjects' summary booklets were 
collected and they received another booklet containing the dependent 
measures. The dependent measures consisted of two questionnaires. The 
first questionnaire contained multiple choice items assessing the 
subjects' memory for facts in the case. Each item had four answer 
choices (a through d) and a confidence rating in the form of a Likert
scale as a manipulation check (1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - S - 9 -  10).
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
The questions pertain to the overall factual material with questions 
embedded in the whole measure regarding the inadmissible testimony 
(questions numbered 3, 12, 13, and 15). The second questionnaire asked 
for demographic characteristics and the subjects' determination of the 
outcome of the case (i.e., negligent vs. not negligent), as well as 
the amount of award recomended and which facts in the case were most
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important in reaching their decision. (Dependent Measures are
contained in Appendix C.)
Subjects wishing to be debriefed about the study were notified
of the date and time when such information would be made available. 
Subjects were then thanked and dismissed.
Data Analysis
Y
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences— Ten (SPSS' ) was 
used to compute one-way analyses of variance for the dependent measure 
items containing a Likert-type scale (choices = 1 to 10). These items 
were questions numbered 4, 5, and 6 on the demographic measure and 
confidence ratings for critical items 3, 12, 13, and 15 on the multiple- 
choice questionnaire (Appendix C) for each group. Scheffe’s test was 
employed in this statistical package to determine which groups 
differed when all possible contrasts were made.
For the dichotomous case-outcome question (negligent vs. not 
negligent) a cbi square test was performed and cross-tabulations of 
this same item were generated for the variables sex, age and 
experimental condition.
The multiple-choice memory scale was also analyzed as a 
dichotomous measure (correct vs. incorrect) and a chi square 
procedure used. When significant differences resulted among groups 
on these items, the Bonferroni significant difference test (BSD) for 
comparisons among individual cells was applied to adjust for Type I 
errors after multiple comparisons were made for all groups.
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Item number 7 was examined for trends and information pertaining 
to the information that subjects felt was important to them in 
deciding the case. No statistical test was used with this item.
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CHAPTER IX 
RESULTS
Negligent vs. Mot Negligent Decision
Table 3 depicts the percentage of subjects who indicated that
Missoula County was either "Negligent" or "Not Negligent" in the death
of Patrick Pullman. The table is broken down by sex. No significant
2differences were found for males and females on this item ( iL = 3.07,
df = 1 , 2 . ^  .05). Sixty-one percent of the female subjects and 78
percent of the male subjects endorsed the "not negligent" verdict for
Missoula County. Thirty-nine percent of the females and 22 percent of
the males chose the "negligent" verdict.
Table 4 contains the case outcome variable broken down by
experimental condition. There were no significant differences found 
2among groups (TC ^ .68, ^  = 2, £  > .05). Seventy percent of the 
subjects in Group One, 70 percent of the subjects in Group Two and 
63 percent of the subjects in Group Three found Missoula County "not 
negligent". Thirty percent of Group One subjects, 30 percent of 
Group Two subjects and 37 percent of Group Three subjects indicated 
that Missoula County was "negligent".
The case outcome item was also analyzed for differences based on 
the age of the experimental jurors and no significant differences were 
found (X^ = 34.02, ^  = 29, £ > .05) for this variable.
-35-
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Table 3
Case Outcome By Sex
Males Females Total
Not Negligent 78% (n = 38) 61% (n = 43) 67.3%
Negligent 22% (n = 11) 39% (n = 28) 32.5%
Total % 41% (n = 49) 59% (n = 71) 100.0%
Table 4
Case Outcome by Experimental Group
Group One Group Two Group Three
Not Negligent 70% (n = 28) 70% (n = 28) 63% (n = 25)
Negligent 30% (n = 12) 30% (n = 12) 37% (n = 15)
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Degree of Negligence
Subjects were asked to rate the degree of negligence shown by the 
Missoula County Technical Center on a 10-point Likert-type scale (1 = 
"definitely negligent" to 10 = "definitely not negligent"). An analysis 
of variance (item by condition) revealed no significant differences 
among groups on this rating. Table 5 depicts the anova. The mean 
rating for all subjects in the sample on this scale was 6.64, standard 
deviation was 3.1, indicating an overall rating on the item in the 
direction of "definitely not negligent".
Decision Confidence
Subjects rated their confidence in their decision regarding 
negligence on a 10-point Likert-type scale from 1 = "completely 
confident" to 10 = "not at all confident". A one-way analysis of 
variance was performed on these data. No significant differences 
were found among groups (see Table 6). The mean rating for all subjects 
in the sample on this decision-confidence item was 2.71, standard 
deviation = 1.81. This group mean reflects a rating on this item in 
the direction of "completely confident".
Award Recommendation
Subjects were asked to rate on a 10-point scale from 1 = "no 
award" to 10 = "the highest award possible" what amount of award they 
would recommend for the plaintiff (family of Pat Pullman). An anova 
resulted in no significant differences among groups for award 
recommendation (see Table 7). The mean rating on this item for all
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Table 5
Degree of Negligence by Group/Anova
Source df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares I 2
Between Groups 2 27.2667 13.6333 1.389 0.2534
Within Groups 117 1148.3250 9.8147
Total 119 1175.5917
Table 6
Decision Confidence by Group/Anova
Sum of Mean
Source df Squares Squares p 2
Between Groups 2 2.8167 1.4083 0.425 0.6547
Within Groups 117 387.5500 3.3124
Total 119 390.3667
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 7
Award by Group/Anova
Source ÉL
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares F R
Between Groups 2 0.0167 0.0083 0.001 0.9989
Within Groups 117 924.3500 7.9004
Total 119 924.3667
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subjects in the sample was 3.78 and the standard deviation was 2.78, 
indicating a general recommendation in the direction of "no award".
Statement Regarding Important Evidence
Subjects were asked to briefly state which pieces of evidence or 
information were most important for them in making their own decisions 
about the case. While these subjective reports were not statistically 
analyzed. Table 8 summarizes responses given by those subjects who 
responded to this item clearly; that is, subjects whose comments 
paralleled their verdict.
Memory Scale
Critical Items. Subjects answered 20 multiple-choice questions 
about facts in the case presentation. Within the twenty questions, 
four "critical items" (questions numbered 3, 12, 13, and 15) were 
embedded which pertained to the inadmissible testimony that subjects 
heard (Group One = heard it, heard judge's ruling, and was admonished 
to disregard it; Group Two = heard it and heard judge's ruling; Group 
Three = heard the testimony without rulings or instructions).
The critical items were collapsed to obtain a composite score for 
each group. There were no significant differences among groups on this 
composite score (see Table 9). Mean scores and standard deviations for 
each group are shown in Table 10.
Individually, a chi square test of each critical item resulted in
9
significant differences among groups for item number 13 (9C ~ 17.46,
7
df = 2, 2. "01), the confidence rating on item number 13 (7̂- = 27.36,
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Table 8
Summary of Responses Regarding Important Evidence
Response Approximate Number Who
Responded
Verdict = NEGLIGENT
The reference to Simons' deposition in which he said 
that it was the instructors' responsibility to
supervise students and to assign partners 11
Not enough supervisors on the job site . . .
ratio 2:20 not adequate for safety 9
Simons "should" have assigned Pat a partner when he
left him at the job site. 5
Lack of back-up warning light on the Cat that backed
over Pat 4
Pullman family deserved to get money to compensate
for the loss of a son 3
Too much equipment on the small job site for so many
students 2
Pat was a very good (careful) student 2
Students had very little experience with this equipment
compared to the instructors (i.e., Marty should not
have been on the Cat alone) 2
If Simons was able to see a grade stake while
looking back from the Cat, then Marty (the driver)
should have been able to see a full-sized man 1
Verdict = NOT NEGLIGENT
Emphasis on safety in the boys' training 19
Students had had several months experience with the 
machinery 9
The Cat was going back and forth in a regular pattern,
making a discernible noise 9
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Table 8 (continued)
Summary of Responses Regarding Important Evidence
Approximate Number Who 
Response Responded
Verdict = NOT NEGLIGENT (continued)
Instructors were busy when the accident occurred 2
Pat was a "perfectionist" 3
It was the students' own responsibility to be
cautious 4
Pat was "careless" or "in the wrong place at the
wrong time" 6
There was a proper ratio of instructors to students
for supervision 2
The family could not prove "negligence" 1
Dangerous work-instructors couldn't watch all
students at all times 2
Pat failed to advise the Cat operator that he was
working behind him 1
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Table 9
Composite Score of Critical Items by Group/Anova
Source
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares F 2
Between Groups 2 3.4667 1.7333 1.519 0.223
Within Groups 117 133.5250 1.1412
Total 119 136.9917
Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations of Groups on Composite Score of Critical
Items
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Group One 2.4250 1.0350
Group Two 2.3250 1.1410
Group Three 2.0250 1.0250
Total 2.2583 1.0729
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df = 14, 2  < .01), and item number 15 ( = 8.75, = 2, 2  ̂ .01)
(see Tables 11, 12, and 13). There were no significant differences among
groups for the remaining critical items (3 and 12) (see Tables 14 and 15).
Multiple Comparisons for Significant Critical Items. Pairwise
comparisons of the significant critical items among the three conditions
employed revealed that, on item number 13, the subjects who were exposed
to all of the objections, rulings, and instructions (Group One) answered
this item correctly significantly more often than the subjects who heard
no objections, rulings or instructions (Group Three) (lO' = 6.76, ^  = 1,
2  < .05), but did not differ significantly from subjects who heard just
the rulings (Group Two) (OC ̂  = 2.49, ^  = 1, 2 > .05). In addition,
Group Two answered this item correctly significantly more often than
Group Three = 15.57, ^  = 1, 2 < .05). Tables 16, 17, and 18 display
the number of subjects in each condition answering either incorrectly
or correctly to this item. The more the subjects heard about the
particular point that item number 13 pertained to, the more frequently
they chose the correct answer to this critical item.
The confidence rating for item number 13 was subjected to a
multiple comparison as well. It was found that all groups differed from
2
each other significantly, with Groups One and Two differing most ( X  =
2
18.56, df = 7, < .05), followed by Groups Two and Three = 15.93,
9
df = 7, 2  ̂ .05) with Groups One and Three differing least ("X- = 6.16, 
dT = 7, < .05). Tables 19, 20, and 21 contain the contingency tables
for each comparison. Mean scores on the 10-point Likert scale are 
portrayed in Table 22. The higher the score, the greater the 
confidence indicated. The group who heard all variables
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Table 11
Critical Item #13 Cross-Classification by Condition and X  ~
Group One Group Two Group Three
INCORRECT (25.2:)
Count 8 3 19
Row Percent 26.7 10.0 63.3
Column Percent 20.0 7.7 47.5
CORRECT (74.S:)
Count 32 36 21
Row Percent 36.0 40.4 23.6
Column Percent 80.0 92.3 52.5
= 17.46388, df = 2, j&= .0002
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Table 12
Likert Scale Confidence Ratina #13 Cross-Classification by
Condition and X.
Group One Group Two Group Three
1 = Mot at all Confident 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
3 r"' 0 1
50.0"* 0 50.0
2.5*** 0 2.5
4 3 0 4
42.9 0 57.1
7.5 0 10.0
5 2 5 1
25.0 62.5 12.5
5.0 12.8 2.5
6 1 0 4
20.0 0 80.0
2.5 0 10.0
7 0 6 2
0 75.0 25.0
0 15.4 5.0
8 1 6 3
10.0 60.0 30.0
2.5 15.4 7.5
9 3 6 3
33.3 44.4 22.2
7.5 10.3 5.0
10 = Completely Confident 29 18 23
41.4 25.7 32.9
72.5 46.2 57.5
lO- = 27.35732, ^  = 14, _p = .0173
= count 
= row percent 
= column percent
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Table 13
Critical Item #15 Cross-Classification by Condition and
Group One Group Two Group Three
INCORRECT (30.3")
Count 11 19 7
Row Percent 29.7 51.4 18.9
Column Percent 27.5 47.5 17.5
CORRECT (69.2%)
Count 29 21 33
Row Percent 34.9 25.3 39.8
Column Percent 72.5 52.5 82.5
7L“ = 8.75285, df_ = 2, 2  = 0.0126
Table 14
Critical Item #3 Cross-
9
-Classification by Condition and OC"
Group One Group Two Group Three
INCORRECT (59.8%)
Count 20 21 29
Row Percent 28.6 30.0 41.4
Column Percent 54.1 52.5 72.5
CORRECT (40.2%)
Count 17 19 11
Row Percent 36.2 40.4 23.4
Column Percent 45.9 47.5 27.5
yj = 4.07953, df = 2, £  = 0.1301
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Table 15
Critical Item #12 Cross-Classification by Condition and
Group One Group Two Group Three
INCORRECT (56.3%)
Count 21 23 23
Row Percent 31.3 34.3 34.3
Column Percent 52.5 57.5 59.0
CORRECT (43.7%)
Count 19 17 16
Row Percent 36.5 32.7 30.8
Column Percent 47.5 42.5 41.0
X "  = 0.37156, ^ = 2 , 2  = 0.8305
Table 16
Comparison of Group One to Group Three on Item #13
Group One Group Three
INCORRECT (33.8%)
Count 8 19
CORRECT (66.3%)
Count 32 21
= 6,76450, ^  = 1, 2. ' .01 (per Bonferroni)
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Table 17
Comparison of Group One to Group Two on Item #13
Group One Group Two
INCORRECT (13.9%)
Count 8 3
CORRECT (86.1%)
Count 32 36
y?  = 2.49576, ^  = 1, > .05 (per Bonferroni)
Table 18
Comparison of Group Two to Group Three on Item #13
Group One Group Two
INCORRECT (27.8%)
Count 3 19
CORRECT (72.2%)
Count 36 21
yj  = 15.57357, df = 1, 2  < .01 (per Bonferroni)
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Table 19
Comparison of Groups One and Two on the Confidence rating for I^em #13
Group One Group Two
1 = Not at all Confident 1 0
2 0 0
3 1 0
4 3 0
5 2 5
6 1 0
7 0 6
8 1 6
9 3 4
10 = Completely Confident 29 18
= 18.56478, d_f = 7, 2  < .05 (per Bonferroni)
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Table 20
Comparison of Groups Two and Three on the Confidence
Rating for Item #13
Group Two Group Three
Not at all Confident 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 1
4 0 4
5 5 1
6 0 4
7 6 2
8 6 3
9 4 2
10 = Completely Confident 18 23
X - = 15.93298, dT = 7, 2 ' .05 (per Bonferroni)
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Table 21
Comparison of Groups One and Three on the Confidence
Rating for Item #13
Group One Group Three
1 = Not at all Confident 0 0
2 0 0
3 1 1
4 3 4
5 n 1
6 1 4
7 0 2
8 ] 3
9 3 9
10 = Completely Confident 29 23
X?  = 6.16850, dT = 7, 2  *01 (per Bonferroni)
Table 22
Means and Standard Deviations for each Group on Subiects' 10-point
Likert Scale Ratings of Confidence on Item #13
Mean Standard Deviation
Group One 8.97 2.15
Group Two 8.48 1.76
Group Three 8.35 2. 2^
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3 i
in the tape (Group One) reported the greatest confidence in the 
correctness of their answer.
On item number 15, the multiple comparisons resulted in a
9
significant difference between Groups Two and Three only ( = 8.20,
df = 1, 2. < .01). There were no significant differences for Groups
7
One and Two (TC = 3.41, df = 1, 2. *05) nor between Groups One and
Three ("X.̂  = 1.14, = 1, 2 -05) (see Tables 23, 24, and 25).
Non-Critical Items. Of the remaining sixteen items on the multiple 
choice memory scale, significant differences were found among groups 
for item numbers 6, 16, 17, and 18; item 6 (X^ = 15.75, df = 2,
2 .01), item 16 (K^ = 9.45, = 2, 2 - *01), item 17 (7C^ = 11.18,
df = 2, 2 .01), item 18 (K.^ = 7.36, = 2, 2  ̂ .05) (see Table 26
for crosstabulations and chi squares; Table 27 for means and standard 
deviations of groups on these items).
Confidence Ratings on Memory Scale Items. No significant 
differences were found among groups for the Likert scale confidence 
ratings on this dependent measure with the exception of item number 13, 
as previously noted (p. 40). Means and standard deviations for all
confidence ratings for all subjects in the sample appear in Table 28.
Other Results
Table 29 contains the mean number of correct responses for each 
multiple-choice item on the memory scale for all subjects.
Table 30 contains chi squared values for all multiple-choice items 
that were not significant and that were not mentioned previously in 
this chapter.
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Table 23
Comparison of Group Two to Group Three on Item #15
54
Group Two Group Three
INCORRECT (32.5%) 19 7
CORRECT (67.5%) 21 33
*X-“ = 8.20513, df = 1 , 2  '05 (per Bonferroni)
Table 24
Comparison of Group One to Group Two on Item #15
Table 25
Comparison of Group One and Group Three on Item #15
Group One Group Two
INCORRECT (37.5%) 11 19
CORRECT (62.5%) 29 21
= 3.41333, = 1, > .05 (per Bonferroni)
Group One Group Three
INCORRECT (22.5%) 11 7
CORRECT (77.5%) 29 33
= 1.14695, df_ = 1, 2  > .05 (per Bonferroni)
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Table 26
and Cross-Classification bv Condition of Non-Critical Items that
attained Significance on the Multiple-Choice Memory Measure
Group One Group Two Group Three
Item 5”
INCORRECT (76.7%)
Count
Row Percent 
Column Percent
35
38.0
87.5
22
23.9
55.0
35
38.0
87.5
CORRECT (23.3%)
Count
Row Percent 
Column Percent
5
17.5
12.5
18
64.3
45.0
5
17.9
12.5
Item 16
INCORRECT (10.2%)
Count
Row Percent 
Column Percent
8
0Ô.7
21.1
0
0
0
4
33.3
10.0
CORRECT (99.8%)
Count
Row Percent 
Column Percent
30
28.3
78.9
40
37.;
100.0
36
34.0
90.0
Item 17
INCORRECT (22.5%)
Count
Row Percent 
Column Percent
16
59.3
40.0
7
25.9
17.5
4
14.8
10.0
COPRECT (77.5%^
Count
Row Percent 
Column Percent
24
35.5
60.0
33
35.5
82.5
30
38.7
90.0
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Table 26 (continued)
9
X "  and Cross-Classification by Condition of Non-Critical Items that
attained Significance on the ; iultinlc-Cboice Oenorv Peasure
Group One Group Two Group Three
Item Ic...
INC0RR2CT (5.0:̂ )
Count 1 0 5
Row Percent 15.7 0 33.3
Column Percent 2.5 0 12.5
CORRECT (05.0%)
Count 39 40 35
Row Percent 34.2 35.1 30.7
Column Percent 97.5 100.0 S7.5
"X r  = 15.74534, ^  = 2, 2  = .0004
= 0.45641, ^  = 2, 2  = .0088
= 11.13230, _df = 2, 2. = .0037
'yj- = 7.36C42, df = 2, £  = .0251
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Table 27
Means and Standard Deviations for Groups on Items #6, #16, #17, #18
Group One Group Two Group Three
X SD X SD X SD
Item 6 .12 .33 .45 .50 .12 . 33
Item 16 .78 .41 1.00 0.00 .90 .30
Item 17 .60 .49 .82 .38 .90 .30
Item 13 .97 . 16 1.00 0.00 .87 .33
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Table 23
Means and Standard Deviations for all subjects on Confidence Rating;
Item Number Mean Standard Deviation
1 9.44 1.19'1 9.45 1.60
.J 9.39 1.69/■, 7.4- 3.00
5 9.65 1.10
6 1.59 1.78
7 9.53 1.16
. 9.27 1.63
9 8.15 2.08
10 8.29 2.49
11 S. 59 1.37
12 3.25 1.95
13 6.53 2.08
14 8.55 2.30
15 8.79 2.12
15 9.07 2.07
17 8.69 2.07
r- 9.46 1.55
19 9.00 1.92
2'j 7.95 o _ ̂ 2
Table 29
Means for all Subjects' Responses to the Memory Scale (Number 
'.'ho Answered Correctly )
Item Number Mean Item Number Mean
1 .31 11 .33
n .87 12 .43
3 .40 13 .74
4 .59 14 .33
5 .94 15 .69
6 .23 16 .69
7 .93 17 .73
8 .91 18 .95
9 .55 19 .82
10 .83 20 .71
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Table 30
Values for Non-Significant Multiple-Choice Items
Item Number -XL? dT significance
1 .11 2 . -'*4
2 .52 0 .77
4 2.21 0 .32
5 4.05 9
7 4.23 9 .09
3 2.34 2 .24
9 .23 2 .39
10 . 66 2 .72
11 5.16 9 .OF
14 .34 2 . 66
19 .36 2 .33
20 5.01 2 .03
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CHAPTER X
DISCUSSION
Results obtained from this study presented a mixed and somewhat 
confusing picture of the area of juror behavior being investigated. 
Memory is a complex process which is not well-understood. The 
multiplicity of factors known to effect the storage and retrieval of 
information and the variables that can intervene to distort, enhance 
or cause mistakes in recall make the measurement of it particularly 
difficult. Therefore, it is necessary to consider not only the 
effects of the independent variable in this study on the memory process, 
but also the possible effects of other variables which may have 
influenced the recall of information. While the research hypothesis 
proposed here was not confirmed by the results, several significant 
differences and important findings stand out and suggest further 
methodological refinements and future directions for jury research.
The present study examined memory as a variable in juror behavior, 
where inadmissible evidence and judicial instruction were varied as 
factors. Some support was found for the hypothesis that a juror's 
memory for inadmissible evidence would be enhanced by a judge's ruling 
and instructing jurors to disregard that evidence. Specifically, on 
one of the four critical questions pertaining to inadmissible testimony 
(item number 13), jurors who had heard the judge's ruling on 
inadmissibility and had been instructed to disregard it, answered the
—60—
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question pertaining to that piece of evidence correctly significantly 
more often than jurors who heard no ruling or intruction. Jurors who 
heard the inadmissibility ruling with no instruction to disregard the 
evidence also answered the question correctly significantly more often 
than those who heard the testimony but heard no ruling or instruction.
In addition, the jurors who heard the judge's ruling and were instructed 
to disregard the evidence expressed significantly greater confidence 
in the correctness of their response to this item.
This finding, while supporting the prediction of the researcher, 
was mitigated by the fact that on the remaining three critical items 
pertaining to inadmissible testimony, significant differences were not 
found for two items and a significant difference on the remaining item 
was found in a direction not predicted by the research hypothesis.
The second critical item that obtained significance pertained to 
whether or not the witness felt that the presence of a back-up alarm on 
the piece of equipment that ran over the deceased would have made any 
difference in the accident happening (see item number 15, Appendix C).
In this case, jurors who heard the testimony without any ruling or 
instruction from the judge answered the question correctly significantly 
more often than jurors who heard the judge's ruling but did not differ 
significantly from jurors who heard both the ruling and instructions 
to disregard.
The wording of this item was examined for semantic flaws and it 
was determined that it was clearly written. However, a review of 
those juror's responses who answered the item incorrectly revealed 
that a large percentage of them chose answer "d", "he did not testify
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on this point", rather than the correct answer, "b", "no". It is 
possible that jurors who had been instructed to disregard chat 
inadmissible evidence (Group One) intentionally answered incorrectly 
in order to follow the instructions given to them that they act as 
much as possible like "real" jurors while participating in the studv.
This explanation would not extend to the jurors who heard the 
evidence ruled inadmissible but received no instruction to disregard 
it. This group differed significantly from the group who heard no 
rulings or instructions by answering correctly less often.
It may well be that jurors in both experimmental Groups One and 
Two experienced what Tanford and Penrod (in press) referred to as 
"interference effects" in their research on joined trials. They found 
that there was a higher conviction rate for defendants who were tried 
on more than one offense simultaneously than when each offense was 
tried alone. They explained the higher rate of conviction by suggesting 
that jurors became confused when trying to recall and separate the 
evidentiary facts about each case in the joined trial. Possibly the 
subjects in the present study were similarly confused when trying to 
recall the answers to critical items that pertained to material in 
the case that had been objected to, ruled on and/or that they had been 
instructed to disregard. Judicial rulings and instructions may have 
served to confuse rather than enhance memory for the critical facts. 
Future research on this point might include a correlational design 
using multiple memory measures. In this way, confusion or interference 
in the memory process might be more evident and more easily assessed 
as an actual event happening during the retrieval stage.
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As Loftus and her colleagues (1980) have shown in a series of 
studies, distortions in stored memory can result from subsequent 
information and events. They also found that nonexistent events can be 
incorporated into people's memories and that the way a question is 
phrased may influence stored memory. Loftus used this evidence of the 
changeable nature of stored memory to support a "reconstructive" 
model of memory, which involves a difference in information that is 
recalled from the initially-stored memory. Clearly, memory is an 
active process that can be influenced by multiple intervening variables 
from the time of storage to the time of retrieval. In this study, 
variables that may have intervened to effect recall are the judge's 
instructions, wording of the dependent measure items, subsequent 
information in the case presentation, personal feelings of the jurors 
regarding the actors or the situation in the case, or any number of 
other subjective variables that would be difficult to measure.
In this study, memory is the process being measured; however, 
since its nature is active and changeable, it is impossible to assess 
with one discrete measure. It appears that more in-depth work is 
needed in this area to determine how multiple factors interact to 
affect memory and how these factors might be controlled in the 
courtroom setting. It has been suggested that videotaped trial 
presentations might provide a means to curtail problems inherent in 
jurors' ability to heed judges' counsel (Tapp & Levine, 1977). 
Specifically, an entire trial would be videotaped and then edited by 
the presiding judge and attorneys. This procedure would allow the 
exlusion of objectionable information, as well as allow the judge to
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give clear instructions to jurors. The relevance of videotaped trials 
for this study and others involving juries is that it would allow a 
comparison of the effects of edited and unedited versions on jurors' 
memory for factual material presented in cases. In addition, it v;oul ■ 
make a dismantling approach more feasible in order to isolate specific 
factors involved in storage and retrieval in the memory process.
Examination of the non-critical memory items on which significance 
was obtained revealed no clear pattern of responding either within or 
across groups. The proportions of correct versus incorrect answers to 
any item in any group seemed to reflect an unexplainable random 
variation when the items were reviewed individually for semantic or 
syntactic problems. While a pilot study was conducted prior to this 
research to determine whether any ceiling effects existed for the 
multiple-choice memory measure, it is possible that subject 
characteristics differed enough from the pilot subjects to the actual 
sample to cause significant differences not obtained in the pilot work. 
For example, the pilot subjects' participation was requested, whereas 
the actual experimental subjects volunteered. The pilot subjects 
read the transcript of the videotapes rather than viewing the trial on 
tape. Also, the pilot sample was small in comparison to the 
experimental sample. More extensive pilot work is indicated for the 
construction of any future dependent measure of this type. The 
previously mentioned factors concerning the multiple influence on memory 
may apply to these non-critical items that attained significance. In 
general, jurors may construct different impressions after combining 
different pieces of information after exposure to the same set of basic
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facts. Future research could include a questionnaire to determine 
subject characteristics beyond those which were obtained in this study.
No significance was found among groups or across sexes on the 
case outcome measure. A higher percentage of people in all groups found 
that Missoula County was "not negligent" in the death of the boy. This 
is consistent with the outcome of the actual trial. What is interesting 
to note in this study is that people's reports of the pieces of 
information that were influential in their decision-making often 
concerned the same points but were viewed from a different perspective. 
For example, some subjects who felt that Missoula County was "negligent" 
felt that the students had an inadequate amount of experience with the 
heavy equipment, whereas, other subjects who found the County "not 
negligent" felt that the students had enough experience. Similarly, 
subjects who chose "negligent" gave reasons such as: "not enough
supervision", "Pat was a very careful student", "family deserved to 
get a financial award", and "it was the instructors' responsibility to 
assign partners", while subjects who chose "not negligent" noted 
reasons like: "adequate supervision", "Pat was careless", "the family
couldn't prove negligence", and "it was the students' responsibility 
to make sure they worked with partners". This information underscores 
the individual, subjective nature of jurors' perceptions. These 
subjects saw the same 40 minutes of tape and attended to the same 
information but developed opposite decisions concerning negligence. 
Because research with noninteracting jurors has been criticized for not 
being generalizeable, this information highlights the importance of 
looking further and deeper into the individual's perceptions. Even
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when jurors deliberate as a group, they seem to maintain individual 
feelings and perceptions regarding cases, as Carretta and Moreland 
C1983) found in their recent work on the "indirect" effects of judicial 
instruction. These individual differences are important to understand. 
This subjective-type of information might allow researchers to 
continue to design more sophisticated studies in order to increase the 
degree of generalizeability of their work.
Finally, subjects' ratings of the amount of award recommended is 
of some importance when considered in relation to the higher percentage 
of "not negligent" verdicts among subjects. There were no significant 
differences among groups on this award recommendation and the mean 
rating for all subjects (x = 3.78) suggests that, in general, jurors 
recommended a small award. An inspection of the individual measures 
revealed a tendency for all subjects to choose a value slightly higher 
than "1" (no award), including the subjects who decided that Missoula 
County was "not negligent" and rated the degree of negligence as 
"definitely not negligent". Apparently the experimental jurors still 
found some small award to be appropriate regardless of "whose fault" 
the accident was. Anecdotally, after the subjects finished with the 
experimental session, many of them asked about the outcome of the actual 
case and commented that they felt that the family "deserved" some 
compensation for the loss of their son. This response seemed emotional 
and empathie. One female subject even commented that she felt that any 
juror who was a mother would be more sympathetic in this case and find 
the County "negligent". Decisions by jurors are clearly not made in 
the absence of strong feelings about "right and wrong", which do not
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always meet a legal definition of "justice". Subject characteristic.-; 
such as age, sex, race, socio-economic status, marital status, religion, 
and education are important variables to note and examine in all future 
research with jurors. This anecdotal information highlights the need 
for extensive analysis of subject characteristics in research with 
juries, as previously proposed.
Limitations of the present investigation include the length of 
the videotaped case presentations in comparison to the actual trial. 
Arlyn Simms actually was re-direct examined and re-cross examined in 
the actual trial several times. Jurors would have had a greater 
opportunity to hear the relevant testimony repeated in the real trial 
a number of times. In the interest of brevity, the tapes presented 
in this study were limited to 40 minutes and the witness was questioned 
only once by the attorneys from each side of the case.
In addition, the present subjects were informed and aware that 
the case presentation was a simulation. This may have reduced their 
ability to attend seriously to the videotapes as well as reduced the 
external validity of the study in general.
A general limitation of this type of research is the use of a 
sample of college students. The literature in this area almost always 
makes reference to the reduction of generalizability from college 
students to an actual jury. However, using a subject population during 
a summer session yielded a much higher mean subject age (x = 28.1; than 
what would have been the case had a sample been drawn from the pool of 
Introductory Psychology students during the normal academic term.
The age range was 18 to 54 in this study, suggesting that results may
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be more generalizable due to a more ''representative" sample of 
experimental jurors. This represents a strength of the study.
A final limitation is that this study looked at jury decisions 
based on data only from noninteracting jurors, which has been 
criticized in past research. Since the outcome decision was not the 
main research interest, it is felt that this limitation is a minor one 
and did not affect results on the memory items, which were the main 
research interest. Also, the subjective data previously discussed 
supports the need and importance of understanding the perceptions of 
individuals in the context of the jury as a group.
Summary
The present study found some important differences between groups 
of subjects who heard varying levels of judicial rulings and 
instructions in the recall of specific information from a civil trial. 
The findings partially support the hypothesis that judicial 
instruction has an effect on jurors' memories. However, in a broader 
sense, the findings elucidate the need for more precise and more 
extensive research in the area of memory as it pertains to the jury 
process. Studies are needed which dismantle the decision-making 
process and allow researchers to look at specific variables that may 
intervene between storage and retrieval. Studies are also : "ded
which examine and control for subject characteristics to further 
understand the individual contribution to the group decision-making 
process.
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While this study did not provide clear answers to any one question, 
it added insight into the direction that this type of research must 
take in order to be of value to the legal community. As with all 
research, each block builds the foundation for the next. Conventional 
methodology cannot resolve the problem inherent in working with memory. 
There is always the possibility that you're observing or measuring 
processes based on different underlying mechanisms. This is not a 
reason to stop adding blocks to the building. With juries, there is 
much room for a continued effort at understanding the influences that 
effect both individuals and the group in the process by which they 
make decisions concerning such important issues.
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The Case of Pullman v s .  Missoula County: Summary
Mr. and Mrs. Albert Pullman, mother and father of the deceased, 
Patrick A. Pullman, brought this law suit as sole heirs of their 
deceased son against the Board of Trustees of the Missoula County 
High School. Patrick was a 19-year old student at the Missoula 
Technical Center. As part of his course activities, Pat was selected 
for on-the-job training at a construction project at the Lolo, Montana, 
Grade School. On April 30, 1973, while Patrick was participating as a 
student assistant at the site in Lolo, he received fatal injuries when 
he was struck by a D-8 Caterpillar Bulldozer. This piece of 
equipment, which backed over the deceased, was operated by Marty 
Larsen, a fellow student working on the project with Patrick. The 
bulldozer had been rented from a local construction company for use 
on the Lolo project. At the time the accident occurred, the D-8 
bulldozer did not have a functioning backup warning signal. It should 
be noted that the law does not require such systems. They are a 
voluntary safety precaution usually observed in the construction 
industry.
INSTRUCTIONS
The videotape which you are about to view is a simulated excerpt 
of the case described above. It begins about half-way through the 
plaintiff's case in this jury trial (the plaintiff is the family of 
Patrick Pullman). You will see the examination and cross-examination 
of a critical witness in the case, Arlyn Simons. Mr. Simons was a
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construction supervisor employed by Missoula County and a heavy equipment 
operation instructor at the Technical Center at the time of the 
incident. Prior to Simons* testimony, two other students who were 
present at the scene, a maintenance man for the Lolo Grade School, and 
the operator of the piece of equipment that struck Pat Pullman have 
testified as to their knowledge of the circumstances of the incident.
While viewing this videotape, you are asked to serve as jurors in 
the case. It will last approximately 40 minutes and it is very important 
that you give your full attention to what you are about to see and hear. 
Treat this presentation as much as possible like the "real thing" with 
important consequences to the family and for the Missoula County 
Technical Center.
The issue at hand in this case is one of negligence. That is, 
does the responsibility for Patrick's death lie with the supervisor's 
of the project on which he was working? Was Missoula County negligent 
in their supervision of the Lolo project?
After you view Mr. Simons' testimony, you will be given a 
questionnaire concerning what you have seen and heard. Again, it is 
important that you put yourself in the role of an actual juror when 
responding to these items and answer as if your decisions are those 
that would determine the outcome of this case.
Thank you for your participation in this case. Your decisions 
will be of great value in answering questions about juror behavior 
and opinions.
The videotape begins with the direct examination of Arlyn Simons 
by Ms. Morrison, attorney for the plaintiffs, the Pullman family. Mr.
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Simons is then cross-examined by Mr. Riley, attorney for the defendant, 
Missoula County.
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(See Appendix A, Case Summary, for a general description of the case. )
The videotapes contained the testimony of the supervisor of the 
Grade School construction project, Mr. Arlyn Simms (name changed to 
'Simons" in order to protect privacy). His testimony was considered 
critical because, testifying as an expert who was present near the 
scene of the accident, he provided an opinion that strongly suggested 
that Patrick Ployhar (name changed to Pullman) was responsible for his 
own death by not following standard and much-emphasized safety 
precautions on the job site. His testimony on this matter was hotly 
debated as to its admissibility in the actual trial and was cause for 
an appeal of the original decision.
Specifically, Simms' testimony contained the following points:
1) He was speaking with Patrick just prior to the accident.
2) He left Pat to go to deal with another problem on the site. 
When he left him, Pat had the equipment for shooting grade 
in his hands and was standing to the right of and behind a 
D-8 Caterpillar Bulldozer that was moving forward and 
backward scraping (leveling) dirt.
3) The Cat was rented, not owned by the Technical Center and 
not equipped with a back-up alarm.
4) Simms did not assign a partner to Patrick when he left him 
and did not instruct him to practice shooting grade in 
this area. He testified that it was Pat's responsibilitv 
to get a partner and/or notify the Cat operator that he 
would be working in the area behind the Cat. These safety
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precautions had been taught to all students in the 
program.
5) Marty Lytle (Larsen) was the student operator of the Cat 
that struck Patrick.
6) All students had had approximately 30 hours of experience 
in operating the heavy equipment.
7) Simms had approximately 15 years of experience in operating 
heavy equipment.
8) All students had received extensive instruction in safety 
precautions.
9) Simms did not witness the accident.
10) Patrick, in Simms' opinion caused his own death by not 
observing safe practice on the job.
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Age: _______
Today’s Date:
Year in College: (circle one) 1 2  3 4 other
Sex : M F
Instructions : Please answer the following questions about yourself and
about the case presentation you have just seen.
1. Have you ever been a member of a jury before?
YES NO
2. How many times have you been a juror?
1 2  3 more
3. Do you believe that Missoula County Technical Center was negligent 
in the case of Patrick Pullman's death?
NEGLIGENT NOT NEGLIGENT
4. Based upon the testimony and facts presented, rate the degree of 
negligence that you feel was shown by the Technical Center by 
circling one of the numbers on the scale below.
1 — 2 — 3 ~ 4 — 5 — 6 ~ 7 — 8 “ 9 — 10 
Definitely Definitely Not
Negligent Negligent
5. Indicate how confident you are that you reached the right decision 
in this case by circling one of the numbers on the scale below.
1 — 2 ~ 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10 
Completely Not at all
Confident Confident
6. If you were to decide on an award for the Pullman family, indicate 
the amount you feel would be appropriate by circling one of the
numbers on the scale below.
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 1 0
No The highest
Award award possible
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7. Please state briefly which pieces of information or evidence in the 
testimony you felt were most influential in your decision:_________
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following multiple-choice questions
pertaining to the testimony you just heard, based on vour best 
recollection. After each question, rate your degree of confidence that 
you have chosen the correct answer by circling one number from 1 - 10 
on the scale below each question.
1, Arlyn Simons has had about 
heavy equipment.
a) 10
b) 20
c) 15
d) 25
years of experience operating
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7  
Not at all 
Confident
9 -  10
Completely
Confident
How many instructors were present at the Lolo School project on the 
day of the incident?
a) 2
b) 5
c) 1 
d ) 6
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 
Not at all 
Confident
9 -  10
Completely
Confident
3. the pieces of equipment owned by the Vo-Tech Center
on the job site were equipped with back-up warning signals.
a ) None of
b) Some of
c) All of
d) Six of
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 
Not at all 
Confident
- 9 - 1 0
Completely
Confident
One of the pieces of equipment used in shooting grade is called a:
a) California rod
b) Pennsylvania rod
c) Shooting rod
d) Philadelphia rod
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 1 0  
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
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5. Simons described Patrick Pullman as:
a) an average worker
b) an exceptionally good worker
c) a hard-headed worker
d) a sometimes very careless worker
1 ~ 2  — 3 - 4  — 5 - 6  — 7 - 8  — 9 - 1 0  
Not at all Comoletely
Confident Confident
6. Simons testified that the responsibility of assigning students to 
work together rested with:
a) the team leaders
b) the boys themselves
c) the instructors
d) both b and c
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
7- When Simons left Patrick just prior to the accident, he _________
assign someone to check grade with him.
a) did
b) did not
c) told someone else to
d) forgot to
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 1 0
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
8. Mr. Simons ____________ see the accident happen.
a) did
b) did not
c) couldn't be sure if he saw all of it
d) saw part of it
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 ~  6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
9. On the first day of the school year in the fall, students in the 
heavy equipment program received:
a) instructions on bulldozer operation
b) instructions on safety
c) a general orientation to the program
d) an orientation to the different types of equipment
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 1 0  
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10. On the job site, students were encouraged to  ___________ if they
were not operating a piece of equipment.
a) check with the supervisor for an assignment
b) watch the others on the equipment
c) practice shooting grade
d) do nothing and stay out of the way
1 - 2 - 3  — 4 -  5 -  6 -  7 -  8 -  9 - 1 0  
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
II Who investigated at the scene of the accident immediately after it 
occurred?
a) a representative of the Sheriff's Department
b) a State Police officer
c) the director of the Vo-Tech Center
d) the other students on the job site
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10 
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
12. Simons testified that he ____________ recall statements being
taken from students at the scene of the accident.
a) did not
b) did
c) couldn't be sure if
d) he did not testify on this point
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10 
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
13. When asked if Pat Pullman stepping in behind a piece of equipment 
was contrary to what he had been taught, Mr. Simons replied that:
a) he could not answer the question
b) it was absolutely contrary
c) it was not an area specifically covered in the safety 
instructions that students received
d) it was not contrary
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10 
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
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14. Looking back from a sitting position on the Cat, a person kneeling
down might be difficult to see because of the ____________ behind
the operator.
a) box-like structure
b) small window
c) heavy wire screen
d) canvas covering
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 
Not at all 
Confident
-  9 -  10
Completely
Confident
15. In Mr. Simon's opinion, would a back-up alarm on the Cat that 
struck Patrick have made any difference in this accident?
a) yes
b) no
c) he couldn't say
d) he did not testify on this point
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 
Not at all 
Confident
7 - 8 - 9 - 1 0
Completely
Confident
16. When the Caterpillar tracks were viewed after the accident it was 
found that the machine was backing up:
a) to the right of its forward direction
b) along the same line that it had gone forward
c) to the left of its forward direction
d) in an erratic fashion
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 
Not at all 
Confident
9 - 1 0
Completely
Confident
17. The day after the accident, Simons went to the Pullman family home 
with:
a) Mr. Brown
b) a police investigator
c) another instructor from the school
d) Marty Larson
1 _ 2 - 3 - 4 
Not at all 
Confident
5 — 6 - 7 - 8 9 -  10
Completely
Confident
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18. Marty Larson was operating the Cat that backed over Patrick:
a) with a supervisor on the Cat with him
b) with another student on the Cat
c) alone
d) with two other students on the Cat with him
1 — 2 — 3 ~ 4 — 5 ~ 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10 
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
19. How many students were present at the Lolo construction site on the 
day of the accident?
a)' 15 - 16
b) 18 - 20
c) 20 - 25
d) 30
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10 
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
20. How many pieces of equipment were being used at the Lolo School 
construction site?
a) 10
b) 12
c) 5
d) 6
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 —  10 
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
